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TEMPERAMENTAL OR TRANSIENT AS A TESSERACT?
ANALYZING PROCESS PATENT ELIGIBILITY POSTDr. Johanna K. P. Dennis*
In holding that the machine or transformation test was not the only way
for processes to satisfy section 101 of the Patent Act, Bilski v. Kappos seemed
to signal the potential for a broadening of patent eligible subject matter to the
outer limits of abstraction. Since Bilski, in fact, we have seen a narrowing of
what constitutes patent eligible subject matter via the Mayo/Alice test as it
relates to computer technologies, business methods, and medical diagnostics,
while the boundaries continue to remain unclear. This paper analyzes the
landscape of section 101 eligibility through the post-Alice landscape by
discussing the trajectory and evolution of process patents, assessing the
prudence of recent attempts to deflect that path, and making
recommendations for navigating a seemingly abstract arena.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

base of intellectual property law. Some of the primary ways that companies
fund research and development are through growing and attributing value to
their intellectual property portfolios, made up of clusters of rights to exclude
others from using or licensing others to use parts and the whole of an

* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of Legal Writing at Golden Gate University School
of Law.

234

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 14:233

innovation.1 Particularly, in patent law, the monopoly obtained tends to be
even more valuable than in trademark and copyright2 contexts because the
thing monopolized is the product of intellectual curiosity, research, and
advancement.3 In trademark, we protect the mark, logo, or brand itself from
use or dilution by others.4
reputation of that with which it is affiliated. It has no other commercial value.
thoughts and musings at a fixed point in time, as demonstrated in their
5
In addition, copyright provides a
restriction on the right to make subsequent derivative works from the
copyrighted work. The value in copyright is not in the actual words on the
pages, so as to prevent another from using those words or ideas to create other
unrelated works. Nor is the value in trademark such that it prevents use of
any and all of the independent parts of the mark in subsequent unrelated
marks. However, patent rights do exactly this protect an invention6 by
preventing others from using not simply the preferred embodiment of the
whole, but any part of the patented invention, fully described in the patent.
The ability to prevent another from using the idea described in one claim is
vastly more powerful than most any power conceivable in either trademark
or copyright. Thus, while in copyright we protect the tangible creation, and
in trademark we protect the design of the creation, in patent we protect the
ideas that give rise to the creation.
But, this concept of protecting ideas is a formidable opponent. Ideas,
thoughts, visualizations of steps and parts coming together are all intangible
and abstract concepts. A patent need not be actually reduced to practice
for it to be
1 See generally Thomas Gering, The Role of Intellectual Property (IP) in R&D-Based Companies:
Setting the Context of the Relative Importance and Management of IP, EUR. COMM N DIRECTORATE-GEN.
JOINT
RES.
CTR.
(Apr.
30,
2004),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/wipo_iasp_ge_04/wipo_iasp_ge_04_8.pdf (discussing use of
IP licenses to generate revenue); Masoud Vakili, Patent Portfolio Valuations-Importance of IP and
Patents, IPWATCHDOG (July 12, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/12/patent-portfoliovaluations/id=85409/ ( Intellectual Property (IP) is a crucial portion of a company s assets. Today, a great
portion of the assets of Fortune 500 companies consists of intangible assets including intellectual
property. ).
2 See Vakili, supra note 1 ( Patents are in many cases the most important portion, especially in the
high tech and biotech industries. ).
3
Ideas are arguably more valuable than tangible things that can be built with them, for one can
use an idea to seed any number of final embodiments and even more ideas. Therefore, excluding others
from using an idea is a substantial barrier to that individual s ability to compete in the same business
market.
4 USPTO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK: ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL
REGISTRATION 2 (2019).
5 Id.
6 Id.
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protectable.7 Further, as we venture deeper into the twenty-first century, some
of the types of innovations with great potential are also capable of posing
great obstacles to future innovation.
II. DEFINING PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Globally, the concept of granting patent monopolies to inventors for
their innovations has required a showing of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness (inventive step), notwithstanding how these terms have been
couched.8 These three pillars are indisputably the hallmarks of innovation,
yet different sovereigns have interpreted the same terms and concepts in
different ways.9 Of the three, the determination of what is sufficient to
constitute the requisite inventive step has been the most turbulent, generating
more confusion and less predictability than could have been foretold.
It would tend to seem straightforward that if someone develops a new
way of solving an existing problem in society, that process would be worthy
of patent. Generally, if this process had not previously been identified in
relation to the problem, then it would be new, so as to satisfy the novelty
requirement.10 Assessments of novelty generally involve addressing whether
the claimed invention was truly discovered or merely identified from preexisting contexts, through comparisons with what is already known to what
is claimed in the invention.11 As to utility, with the exception of innovations
treading areas and concepts that particular sovereigns deem requiring a
balancing of interests,12 or an assessment of usefulness as a patented product

7 2138.05
PRE-AIA
35
U.S.C.
102(g),
USPTO
(2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2138.html#d0e207753.
8 See Patents, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2020); World
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions
and
Limitations
to
the
Rights,
at
2,
SCP/13/3
(Feb.
4,
2009),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf ( [O]nly those [inventions] that meet the
three patentability criteria, i.e., novelty, inventive-step (non-obviousness) and industrial applicability
(utility) are entitled to patent protection so that only the inventions that contribute to technical progress
are rewarded. ).
9 See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Exclusions from Patentable Subject
Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights, at 6 8, SCP/13/3 (Feb. 4, 2009),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_13/scp_13_3.pdf.
10 See e.g., Jose Luis Reyes Villamizar, WIPO Sub-Regional Workshop on Patent Policy and Its
Legislative
Implementation,
WIPO
(2013),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/patent_policy/en/wipo_ip_skb_13/wipo_ip_skb_13_t10.pdf (slide on
novelty).
11 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
12 Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the OncoMouse, WIPO MAG. (June 2006),
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/article_0006.html
[hereinafter
Case
of
the
OncoMouse]; Dennis Borges Barbosa & Karin Grau-Kuntz, World Intellectual Property Organization
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as compared to usefulness in solving a problem, this is not often a high hurdle
for the inventor to traverse. Third, inventors need to demonstrate that what
they have claimed contains an inventive step and thus would not be obvious
to someone in the field.13 Of these three, non-obviousness and novelty have
been more perplexing when it comes to methods and processes.
In other areas of law based in statutes when seeking a definition or
guidance, interpreters turn to the statute itself, other contexts with similar
structures, legislative intent, and then prior precedent. As to novelty, the
statute itself provides some guidance, by i
body of technological knowledge known and available) should be
considered.14
underpinned the issue of patent eligibility. Similarly, as to non-obviousness,
here the focus is on the differences between what is already known and the
claimed invention to determine whether those differences are sufficient to
render the content not obvious.15 On this score, case law runs far and wide,
and several major hallmarks have transformed much of patent prosecution
for methods and processes into a patent eligibility pursuit. The basic premises
are that all patentable processes must be new else the very meaning of
patentable processes must have a purpose
or solve some identified problem, and that all patentable processes should
advance the field by adding something more than what is already known to
be there. What is an inventor if not someone who creates and contributes to
their field?
Arguably, the patent monopoly system does not seek to reward
individuals for mere stenography or observation of existing biological or
chemical processes. Nor does it seek to compensate for mathematical
derivations, formulas, or algorithms, which form the computational basis of
technological and physical arts. Both of these groups of processes are those
which involve nothing more than asserting that which already exists, occurs,
or results independent of the inventor. Thus, the universe of patentable matter
16
limited by the
caveat that the subject matter must also be eligible for patent. The
determination of what is eligible and what is not has come down to an
inclusion or exclusion analysis.17 Over time, the United States Supreme Court
[WIPO], Exclusions from Patentable Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights Biotechnology, SCP/15/3, Annex III, at 30 35 (Jan. 1, 2010).
13 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015).
14 Id. § 102.
15

Id. § 103.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
17 See Dennis Borges Barbosa & Karin Grau-Kuntz, supra note 12, at 6.
16
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has determined that abstract ideas, mathematical formulas or algorithms, and
laws of nature are not eligible for patent,18 while anything falling outside
those categories is indeed eligible.
As technology develops and we create methods of doing things more
efficiently, more reliably, and more consistently, are those methods also not
done less efficiently, unreliably, and with variable results without the aid of
calculations, and humankind has known about systems of numbers for
thousands of years? What then serves as the spark to encourage individuals
to innovate,
innovation is intentionally intangible and purposefully abstract, deliberately
so because the intention is to replace human mental processes.19 These types
substantial costs to innovate,20 but in light of the judicial exceptions to patent
eligibility, there remains the question as to whether there is any patent
monopoly to be gained from AI innovations.
III.

OU DON T OWN ME

There is no debate about ownership of the sun, the moon, and the stars.
No one person or entity owns the naturally occurring cycles that give us rain,
sleet, snow, or hail. These are owned by no one and all of us the same. This
premise justifies the three judicial exceptions discussed herein, all of which
relate to aspects which it is presumed are not capable of ownership. In
economics, that scarcity makes a commodity more valuable is not an idea
that one can prevent others from using to fix their prices based on data about
resource availability. Similarly, in biology, notwithstanding the countless
hours Mendel put into crossing pea plants, he would not have been able to
prevent anyone from doing the same crosses to produce their own peas.
This author previously argued that foundational research should not be
patent eligible subject matter, on the basis of balancing usefulness as a
patented invention against potential usefulness to the public at a reasonable

18

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 86 (1981).
See
Artificial
Intelligence
What
Is
and
Why
It
Matters,
SAS,
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/what-is-artificial-intelligence.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2020).
20 See, e.g., Nelson Cicchitto, What Is the Cost of Implementing AI Today?, AVATIER (May 9,
2019), https://www.avatier.com/blog/what-is-the-cost-of-implementing-ai-today/; SAS Announces $1
Billion
Investment
in
Artificial
Intelligence
(AI),
SAS
(Mar.
17,
2019),
https://www.sas.com/en_us/news/press-releases/2019/march/artificial-intelligence-investment.html.
19
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cost, and on the basis of promoting further innovation through unfettered
access to the building blocks of innovation.21 In terms of industrial-era
machines, articles of manufacture, processes, and compositions of matter, the
determination of where lay the pillars of research, such as to be excluded
from patent protection, was generally a straightforward concept to apply. For
example, it was commonly known and undisputed that the naturally
occurring elements in the periodic table, which form the basis of all
compositions of matter, are not patent-eligible subject matter because they
on the jurisdiction, synthetic elements may be able to obtain patent
protection22 and are patent-eligible subject matter. Similarly understood as
beyond patent-eligible subject matter were raw mathematical formulas,
algorithms, and laws of nature, which merely described series of steps that
existed entirely independent of human intervention.
In the context of the modern biotechnological era, these concepts were
finding ways to pre-diagnose through genetics. Referring to the Harvard
OncoMouse,23 perhaps the most famous of the first transgenic animals,24 this
development was not
constituted foundational research. Notwithstanding human involvement in
integrating a recombinant activated oncogene sequence that triggered tumor
growth into both germ and somatic cells of the mouse, it was not through
human involvement that either mitosis or meiosis occurred growing the cells
to become the stereotypical white lab mouse. These scientists should have
been no more able to monopolize the mouse that developed independently
than they could grass and weeds. Furthermore, as borne out in the range of

21 See Johanna K.P. Dennis, Divergence in Patent Systems: A Discussion of Biotechnology
Transgenic Animal Patentability and U.S. Patent System Reform, 1 INT L J. PRIV. L. 268, 268 303 (2008).
22 See Element Patented for the First Time, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1964),
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/11/14/archives/element-patented-for-the-first-time.html (US patents to
Americium-95 and Curium-96); Zack Mummery, International Year of the Periodic Table Can a
Chemical
Element
Be
Patented?,
REDDIE
&
GROSS
(June
27,
2019),
https://www.reddie.co.uk/2019/06/27/international-year-of-the-periodic-table-can-a-chemical-elementbe-patented/ ( A newly synthesised chemical element would not be excluded from patentability for being
a discovery, at least in the UK and before the European Patent Office (EPO), because the new element
would have been synthesised. ).
23
Case of the OncoMouse, supra note 12.
24 See, e.g., Jerry Adler, The First Patented Animal Is Still Leading the Way on Cancer Research,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/firstpatented-animal-still-leading-way-cancer-research-180961149/.

2020]

Temperamental or Transient as a Tesseract?

239

litigation about whether the mouse could be patent eligible,25 it was
questionable for the U.S. to have allowed an application for patent26 to pass
sought to be patented was a living being but for the gene, it was like all
other beings of its kind
manufactured at all.27 Oncology, which focuses heavily on determining what
treatments are effective on tumor cells, stood to benefit from a living test
subject, upon whom treatments could be administered and effects measured
by way of clinical trial as opposed to the limited scope of laboratory in vitro
studies.28 Accordingly, a patent to the basis of that research would necessarily
transform the laws of nature, here development of mammal germ and somatic
cells into a being, from patent-ineligible to patent-eligible subject matter. In
this sense, biotechnology and genetically engineered end-products, which
for research in medicine,
pharmacology, and beyond, should have been viewed the same as other
foundational patent-ineligible subject matter.29
A quarter of a century after the Harvard OncoMouse was patented in the
US, the patent eligibility issue came full circle when the US Supreme Court
recognized that the core foundation of genetic research is naturally occurring
genes and DNA sequences which are not patent-eligible subject matter, while
synthetically or human-created sequences could be patented.30 One could
make the case that because the OncoMouse only grew into a creature through
naturally occurring biological processes, it remained a mouse and thus
patent-ineligible subject matter.
There is also a key
research, such as genes on the micro-level
and the manner in which lab researchers introduced chemicals and cells to

25 The Harvard OncoMouse was patented in the U.S. (US Pat. No. 4,736,866) in an application
referencing non-human mammals. It was eventually allowed by the European Patent Office after a lengthy
inquiry and amendment of the application limited to transgenic mice. See, e.g., T 0019/90 (Onco-Mouse)
of
3.10.1990,
EUR.
PAT.
OFF.,
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-lawappeals/recent/t900019ep1.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). Meanwhile, the Canadian patent office
rejected the OncoMouse patent application on the basis that higher life forms were not patentable.
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] S.C.R. 45 (Can.).
26 The first patent to the OncoMouse was granted in 1988 in the United States. U.S. Pat. No.
4,736,866.
27 See Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.) (stating
that the OncoMouse was not an article of manufacture).
28 See also Case of the OncoMouse, supra note 12 (EPO s analysis concluded that the usefulness
of the OncoMouse in furthering cancer research satisfied the likelihood of substantial medical benefit, and
outweighed moral concerns about suffering caused to the animal. ).
29 See Dennis, supra note 21, at 286.
30 See Ass n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013).
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31

While the naturally occurring genes and mice are
foundational to developing therapies and treatments, a strong argument may
be made that the specific analyses and trials conducted to either stimulate or
suppress cell development should be both patentable and patent eligible as
these me
scientific knowledge and resources, but their creativity and imaginations.32
Of similar less-disputed genre are the resulting medicines compositions of
matter derived from the processes themselves. However, the current state
of the law pertaining to patent eligibility has operated to invalidate some
innovations and draw into question others in the realm of what a mere decade
ago would have been accepted as protectable research innovations and
creative business methods.33 An analysis of how our system has come to this
point and where we are headed is warranted.
IV. BACKGROUND ON PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Over the history of patent law, no one statute has caused so much
consternation as has 35 U.S.C. § 101,
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
34
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
Section
35
101 of the Patent Act was intended to be broad in scope to allow for a large
range of potential innovations. In listing the four categories within it, the
and such will be patent eligible. The provision only provides a basis that these
are the classifications of patentable innovations. To pass the gauntlet into the

31
32

See Dennis, supra note 21, at 279; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 577.

See also Myriad, 569 U.S. at 596, 595 (There were no method patents at issue in this case, nor
did the case involve patents on new applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.
The Court noted that [h]ad Myriad created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching
for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a method patent. ).
33 See Robert P. Greenspoon, Congress Section 101 Fix Would Create a 112(f) Problem,
IPWATCHDOG (May 28, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/28/congress-section-101-fixcreate-112f-problem/id=109766/ (The Courts recent rulings catastrophically undermine[] and
invalidate[] important patents that, until then, protected breakthrough inventions. ).
34 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2020).
35 See Daniel T. Taskalos, Returning to the Status Quo? Proposed Outline for Section 101
Reform, NAT L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/returning-to-status-quoproposed-outline-section-101-reform ( Section 101 only recites broad categories of patent-eligible subject
matter. ); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER REFORM IN THE
116TH CONGRESS (Sep. 17, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45918.pdf; see also 2111 Claim
Interpretation;
Broadest
Reasonable
Interpretation,
USPTO
(2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html (During patent examination, the pending claims
must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. ).
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patent monopoly, the innovation must also be eligible for patent as based on
the existing legal system.
Section 101 was relatively untouched for much of the over 200-year
history of the Patent Act. Over the past 47 years, the Supreme Court has
reshaped the image of patent eligibility for processes and business methods,
starting in 1972 with Benson.
In Gottschalk v. Benson,36 in discussing a patent involving a
mathematical formula in conjunction with a digital computer, the Supreme
Court held that since the formula had no practical application outside of the
computer, i.e., served no purpose except when integrated or run on a digital
computer, allowing a patent to the computer using the formula would be in
fact a patent to the formula itself. This kind of patent would be stifling to
research, as allowing one inventor to hold control over the computer-formula
combination would mean all others would not be able to develop any
technology deriving from the formula either since they could not do so
without using a computer.
Then, six years later, in Parker v. Flook,37 the Court again addressed
formulas and determined that claims in a patent were not patent eligible nor
these claims, it would proceed as if the principle or formula were wellknown. This essentially rendered every conceivable algorithm, whether or
the Court views as patent ineligible.
Three years later in Diehr,38 the Court provided some hope by its
were not the same as concepts themselves.
Even so, at the end of this body of cases, we had solidified the judicially
created exceptions to patent eligibility as being laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.
As such, it has come to be known that the official position is that section
d; laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas have never been
patentable.39 It should be noted there is nothing written into section 101

36
37
38

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 211 (1981).
We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable. Ass n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 02 (2010);
O Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
39
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providing for any limitation at the patent-eligibility threshold based on
One argument for why these aspects should be excluded is that mankind
does not invent that which fundamentally exists outside of his intervention
both of which true laws of nature and natural phenomena do. There then
remain abstract ideas, which in the world before artificial intelligence would
tend to require the thought by an individual, as an idea was not thought to be
something that could exist apart from the human mind.
What remained murky is where an idea surpasses being merely abstract
so as to permit patent and the right to exclude all others from its use. On this,
patentees, patent practitioners, and Courts have seemed to drift rudderless in
search of Treasure Island, with tests eluding and articulating where this line
is.40 Furthermore, the very purpose of AI is often to replace that which we
would do with our own minds. Thus, we train AI machines to recognize
and the possibility that all of that work
may not provide any monopoly could serve as a disincentive to innovation.41
V.

RECENT TRAJECTORY

A.

Refining the Exceptions

Since Diehr, the U.S. patent system

from the U.S. Patent and

ns
consistently lagging behind it.
Prior to 2010, the test used to determine whether a process was patent
concrete, and tangible result 42 This result-oriented test articulated by the
Federal Circuit in 1998 ruled the roost and provided a predictable means of
evaluating how to navigate office actions, until the Court stepped in for the
first time since Diehr, allegedly to clarify the scope of patent eligible subject
matter. What came next threw the door wide open on what types of things
could be patent eligible.

40 See, e.g., Angelo J. Bufalino & Christopher P. Moreno, The U.S. Supreme Court s Ruling in
Bilski v. Kappos: Hedging Against Bright-Line Rules, NAT L L. REV. (Sep. 4, 2010),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-supreme-court-s-ruling-bilski-v-kappos-hedging-againstbright-line-rules.
41 See, e.g., Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589 ( [P]atent protection strikes a delicate balance between
creating incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery and imped[ing] the flow of
information that might permit, indeed spur, invention. ).
42 See St. Street Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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In Bilski v. Kappos, the Office and the courts were faced with a matter
involving a business method patent that had disclosed a method for hedging
against price-fluctuation risk in the commodity markets.43 Ultimately at all
levels, from the PTO through to Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, the
patent was found not to be patent-eligible as it recited a fundamental
economic principle.44 While invalidating the patent, the Supreme Court
restructured the analysis for assessing whether a process or business method
was patent eligible. While some patents may fall neatly within either a
machine or a transformation, the test the Federal Circuit had adopted for use
below,45 according to the Court, those were not the only ways that these
patents could be patent eligible.46 And that was it.
What were the other ways? Bilski
confusion and laid groundwork for the need for the Court to re-explain these
boundaries, if any. In a combination of cases shifting the patent eligibility
test even further from its roots in State Street,47 the Court articulated a twostep test that focuses on spotting the
patent.
First, in 2012, the Court turned t
to address patent eligibility in Mayo v. Prometheus Labs.48 In so doing, it
took account of all three of its own preexisting judicial exceptions, which had
hitherto focused only on business methods, and the mathematical algorithm
and abstract ideas exceptions discussed in their prior cases, to fashion a
suitable test for medical diagnostics. One significant aspect of Mayo was this
extension of the judicial exceptions framework previously applied to
business methods, now into medical technologies.
Subsequently, in Mayo v. Prometheus Laboratories, the claims read to
a method of administering a drug, checking and determining concentration
of a metabolite, and then based on that measurement, making a decision as
to dosage. The core of that process lay in the biochemical relationship

43

Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593.
Id. Further, in Bilski, the PTO and CAFC had rejected as unpatentable a method of determining
and balancing risk, such as weather-related risks, in commodities trading. See Johanna K.P. Dennis,
Redux on the Process of Patenting and the U.S. Supreme Court s Consideration of Bilski?, 2010
TEMPLE J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL L. 1, 1 (2010). Separate from the tests discussed by the Court, some have
stated that by all accounts and under any test or analysis the claimed invention was unpatentable. See id.;
Johanna K.P. Dennis, The Process of Patenting: Why Should We Care About a Potential U.S. Supreme
Court Decision in Bilski v. Doll?, 25 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 543 53 (2009).
44

45 In Bilski, the State Street test was rejected by CAFC and instead replaced with a two-pronged
test either a machine or a transformation was required to demonstrate patent eligible subject matter.
The Supreme Court affirmed that this was one test but not the only test and this became the new normal.
46 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593.
47 St. Street Bank & Tr. Co., 149 F.3d at 1368.
48 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
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between concentration of one thing and the effect it would have on another.
In finding the claims patent ineligible, the Court held that these steps
a
were not enough to overcome the
presumption of patent ineligibility triggered when a claim fell within a
judicial exception. We previously knew from Flook that claims reading to
calculations, and thus measurement, would not survive a challenge on the
basis of judicial exception.49 Instead of being viewed as a distinct method
and one which may, in fact, have surpassed the State Street
, concrete
the claims asserted were rejected as the types of
things scientists do in labs on a routine basis, while determining dosage based
on the effect of a drug on a patient is routine in the practice of medicine. 50
While recognizing that to some degree all inventions involve in some
way laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas, the Court created
from whole cloth a two-part test for determining patent eligibility.51 To
engage in the analysis about whether an invention was patent ineligible due
to a judicial exception, in what may seem like an obvious first step, but one
the Court articulated as necessary, the claims must focus (individually or
collectively) on either a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract
idea. If a judicial exception is triggered, then the analysis turns to being able
to identify and isolate what aspect above and beyond the exception is present
in the claims.52 This step-two search, also known as the search for the
inventive step, has been the bane of many a patent pra
By this point, hope for a clear framework for business method patent
eligibility was but a pipe dream, given that the new framework articulated in
Bilski
away from a test that involved
some aspect of goalposts, albeit with a catch-all third category, to a test that
involved a more subjective barometer. Just
language foreshadowed more to come, this new test in Mayo in the medical
diagnostics context cried out to be cloned into business methods. This Alice53
did.
Alice so closely resembled Bilski that, notwithstanding the industry
reaction to Alice as a gamechanger, an argument could be made that Alice did
nothing more than rei
Bilski
as the test that applications for processes and methods that seek to patent

49
50
51

See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).
See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72.

See id.
See id. at 79.
53 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
52
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an abstract idea and nothing more will never be patentable.54 Perhaps the
patent community should have been on notice from then. While Bilski
involved a method for avoiding or minimizing against risks of price
fluctuation,55 Alice involved mitigation of risks in settlement via a neutral
third party.56 Both involve principles in economics,57 and absent any
intervening change in the law or new test announced by the Court, one might
have predicted that the patents in Alice would have been found patent
ineligible just as was the case in Bilski.58
Accordingly, two years post-Mayo, when faced with the patents in Alice,
the Court extended the Mayo two-step test to business-method patents, while
indicating an intent to permit patents involving a judicial exception only
exception itself.59
In both Mayo and Alice, the emph
integrating into something more, transforming into something more,
performing something more and determining whether the additions recited
Notwithstanding this repeated emphasis on
the Court provided little direct instruction in what is
Given the extent to which the Court describes
while expressly
delimit the precise contours of the abstract ideas
category, one can only assume that the Court did not intend to provide a

54

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id.
56 Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 208. What was at issue, here, was the concept of ensuring that both
parties to an agreement would pay or perform their obligations through having a trusted third party
verify payment or performance of both parties before any consideration was released to either party. In
Alice, the claims involved a major concept in economics i.e., using an intermediary to assess or mitigate
risk. Using a computer, without more, does not render the concept inventive where the core remains the
idea itself. For instance, while the idea of adjusting cost based on supply and demand is a basic one in
economics and, therefore, a method described that involves a computer gauging and reporting the volume
of demand, comparing with available supply of vendors for a product, and then using an algorithm
adjusting the cost to be charged, would not be patentable. Such a method does not describe anything other
than already known concepts in economics and business.
57 Just like in Bilski, the claims in Alice read to risk management methods, and specifically, a
computerized scheme for mitigating settlement risk. Id. at 213. Just as Bilski involved a third-party
intermediary, so too did Alice. The claims in the four patents at issue were designed to facilitate the
exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party
intermediary. Id.
55

58

-party intermediary
settlement,
59 Id. at 225 27.

Id. at 219
Id. at 220.
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bright-line or create a predictable test.60 Having started out with the
pronouncement of the judicial exceptions on a clean slate and now having a
test articulated as purposefully non-restrictive, over the past four decades, the
Court seemed to have come full circle with respect to articulating the ways a
patent application for process or method may escape or fall within the judicial
exceptions.
B.

The Legal Aftermath

In other areas of U.S. law, when the rules change in such a way as would
be a detriment to some, they are only applied prospectively, in the interests
of notice and predictability, with ex post facto laws being generally
discouraged.61 However, in patent law, when the rules change as to patent
eligibility, even though inventors could not have been on notice of not yet
created rules, restrictions, or their implications, their inventions may be
subjected to invalidation,62 which does not trigger ex post facto concerns,
since it is not the passage of a law but a determination that the patent was
invalid at inception or is invalid under current law. In one sense, this is
defensible; the stakes in allowing a patent to an innovation public
disclosure at the price of exclusive and enforceable rights to monopoly are
quite high. It should follow then that at any given time, society would only
want those rights to be enforceable by people whose innovations are, as of
that moment, recognized as within the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.
Instead of a static patent system, changing laws and reassessment of the scope
of patentability renders the system dynamic and responsive to the changes in
technology and one where enforceable monopolies reflect current scientific
knowledge.

60
61

Id. at 221.

See U.S. CONST. art I, §§ 9, 10.
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2019); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2019) (infringement actions may be brought
anytime during patent term, and since invalidity is a defense to infringement, then invalidity proceeds may
also be bought any time during the term of a patent); see also Inter Partes Review, UNITED STATES PATENT
&
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patentdecisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last modified May 9, 2017); Post Grant Review, UNITED STATES
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patentdecisions/trials/post-grant-review (last modified May 9, 2017); Ryan Kenny, Which Invalidity Avenue to
Take: Inter Partes Review Verses Post-Grant Review, IPWATCHDOG (July 31, 2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/31/which-invalidity-avenue-ipr-verses-post-grantreview/id=99460/; Shruti Mehta, Alternative Pathways for Challenging Patent Validity in the US, IQVIA
(May 2, 2019), https://www.iqvia.com/blogs/2019/05/alternative-pathways-for-challenging-patentvalidity-in-the-us.
62
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Unsurprisingly then, in the wake of Alice, there has been extensive
activity at all levels involving process patents,63 which had been predicted in
64
in addition to hefty criticism
65
from the patent community. First, there was a substantial amount of
litigation; more than 7,000 decisions have cited Alice in only five years
(2014 2019),66 averaging over 1,400 cases each year. In the same time frame,
over 6,000 decisions in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have cited or
otherwise relied on Alice. Alice has definitely won the middle school
popularity contest. As would be expected, the substantial volume of these
cases (all but 140) is in the federal district court, where infringement claims
are raised and invalidity proceedings end up after agency reexamination and
appeal. In almost every case, at some point in district court, the alleged
infringers file dispositive motions (e.g., motions to dismiss the claim of
infringement or motions for summary judgment in their favor), asserting that
the patent(s) are invalid due to being drawn to patent-ineligible subject
matter.
These motions are usually denied because they address patent validity
at an early stage in the litigation. 67 On a motion to dismiss, where there is a
grant the motion and dismiss the
complaint.68 Similarly, on a motion for summary judgment, the court should
grant the motion where there are no genuine issues of material facts as to a
threshold issue such as patent eligibility.69 Alice
-step analysis has
63 See, e.g., Erin Coe, The Battle for Patent Law: Federal Circuit Looks to Hold the Line as
Supreme
Court
Eyes
IP,
KIRKLAND
&
ELLIS
(2016),
https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/News/Law360%20(The%20Battle%20for%20Patent%20Law_%20
OQuinn)%20July%202016.pdf.
64 CLS Bank Int l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., dissenting)
( [I]f all of these claims, including the system claims, are not patent-eligible, this case is the death of
hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system, and software patents
as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents. ).
65 See, e.g., Taskalos, supra note 35 ( The relative fluidity of patent eligibility jurisprudence since
the Court s decision in Alice has caused difficulties not only for potential inventors and industry, but also
for the patent bar at large. ).
66 As of January 24, 2020, there were 7,401 federal court opinions citing Alice. Of these 125 were
from the Federal Circuit, which though comparably few, still constitutes an average of 25 opinions each
year or one opinion every two weeks.
67 See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Puma N. Am. Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174359, at *7 (D. Mass. 2016)
(motion to dismiss denied); see also CardioNet, LLC v. ScottCare Corp., No. 12-2516, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 173622 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2017) (motions to exclude evidence and testimony of expert witnesses
as to infringement and non-infringing alternatives, which could have determinative effect for one or
another side, were denied).
68 See supra note 67.
69
When there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether[, for example,] the claim
element or claimed combination is well-understood, routine, [ and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the
relevant field, this [Section 101] issue can be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law.
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created an inroad for defendants to seek application of Alice earlier and
earlier in proceedings seeking judgment in favor of the alleged infringer; in
some cases, alleged infringers have found filing dispositive motions at the
district court level effective.70
Meanwhile, there have been just over 100 decisions from the Federal
Circuit in that same time, which is even still a substantial number, since it
suggests a rate of twenty appellate decisions involving similar Alice issues
each year.
Three post-Alice cases in the Federal Circuit have helped to provide
lusive patent court
views Alice. The Federal Circuit grappled with identifying where step one of
the Alice inquiry ended and where step two began. It has also attempted to
triggering judicial exceptions.71 Among these decisions, DDR Holdings,72
Enfish,73 and Electric Power74 are notable.
First, the court laid groundwork for the potential to excise itself from
the entanglements of the Mayo/Alice test, by isolating only those cases where
it need venture past step one into step two. For those cases where the inquiry
ends at step one, the court need not dance with Alice.
In Enfish,75 the court found the claims were patent eligible because they
fell outside step one as neither laws of nature, natural phenomena, nor
abstract ideas. As the Federal Circuit put it, claims directed to an

S.I.SV.EL. Societa Italiana per lo Sviluppo Dell Elettronica S.p.A v. Rhapsody Int l Inc., No. 18-69-MNCJB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37508, at *12 13 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2019) (quoting Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018)) (granting defendants motion for summary judgment as to 202
patent) (alterations in original). But see S.I.SV.EL v. Rhapsody Int l Inc., No. 18-69-MN-CJB, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 39305 (D. Del. Mar. 12, 2019) (denying defendants motion for summary judgment as to
123 patent because of conflict between testimony by plaintiff s expert and defendant s expert regarding
whether the ordered combination in the claims demonstrated novelty).
70 See, e.g., Tele-Publishing, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 17, 27 28 (D. Mass. 2017)
(granting motion for summary judgment on the basis of finding claims to be drawn to an abstract idea in
Alice step one and failing to contain an inventive step in Alice step two); Smart Software, Inc. v.
PlanningEdge, LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 243, 249 50 (D. Mass. 2016) (granting defendant s motion to
dismiss because the patent fails to provide the necessary inventive concept in Alice step two); Zkey
Invs., LLC v. Facebook Inc., 225 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1155 59 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (granting motion for
summary judgment to alleged infringer based on Alice step two). But see Zak v. Facebook, 206 F. Supp.
3d 1262, 1264 65 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (denying motion for summary judgment on basis of demonstrating
an inventive step in Alice step two).
71 See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green
Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
72 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (upholding validity
of computer-implemented patent claims after Alice).
73 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
74 Elec. Power Grp., LLC. v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
75 Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1691 92.
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improvement of, not in addition to, computer functionality are not in and of
themselves abstract ideas under step one. One could argue that there is a very
fine line between an addition to an invention and an improvement of the
invention, given that often improvements involve additions and some
additions operate to improve. Nonetheless, here the Federal Circuit escaped
from grappling with Mayo/Alice, while reaching a positive outcome for the
patent holder.
By comparison, in DDR Holdings,76 the court danced the two-step,
finding that the patents did indeed read to patent eligible subject matter.
There, the matter indisputably put the court on the dance floor there was an
abstract idea of how hyperlinks work coupled with connections and coding
on the back end, not visible to the user.77 Yet the court found the claims patent
traffic. Of significance to the court was that the claims
described a proc
to achieve a result responsive to a particular problem. By contrast, claims
involving use of computers will necessarily fail Alice step two where they
78

79

Third, and by contrast, in Electric Power, the patents described and
claimed real-time performance monitoring and were found to be patent
ineligible under the test.80
concepts, the court pushed the analysis into step two.81 The claims failed there
the particular field and the claimed processes being indistinguishable from
re excluded from
section 101. Electric Power is concerning for AI innovations exactly because
82

If more efficient improvements and ways of performing
ordinary mental processes by use of computer technology are not patent
then quite a bit is at stake at being excluded from patent protection. Problems
76

DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1255.

77

Id. at 1257.
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
79 Id. at 1325 (quoting Alice, 572 U.S. at 225).
78

80

Elec. Power Grp., LLC. v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1353 54.
82 Id. at 1355.
81
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arise in creation of AI systems and innovations created by them, where what
the patent application truly is seeking to protect is a function of mathematics,
statistics, and data, as it relates to a particular industry. There, it may truly be
novel but the applicant will butt up against the existing case law on judicial
exceptions and certainly Mayo/Alice. In these instances, both in and outside
of AI, it is to be expected that a large majority of business methods that are
grounded
something unconventional and nonroutine from that data will be patent
ineligible under the guise of being themselves the building blocks of business
strategies of tomorrow.
With this volume of litigation in such a short timeframe, there is some
concern that the current Mayo/Alice test is unclear, confusing, and difficult
to apply.83 This translates into the concern, notwithstanding the ability to
retrain and develop new strategies,84 that where there is uncertainty,
application of the test would similarly be unpredictable.85 In this industry,
allegations of uncertainty tend to skew towards predictions of rejections of
pending applications and invalidations of already-issued patents, in either
case increasing the dockets pertaining to section 101 challenges.
C.

Agency Adaptation

The patent community has generally opined that as the legal landscape
has shifted, purportedly in response to changes in technology, inventors and
patent practitioners have struggled to adapt prospective and existing process
applications and defend issued process patents from invalidation. Some go
so far as to say that changes in defining patentable processes have had a
negative effect on research and development as evidenced by the volume of
patent applications, issued patents, and invalidity proceedings, particularly in
terms of patents involving implementation on a generic computer.86
83 See also Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Lawless Decision by an Omnipotent Court
Wreaking Havoc on Patents (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23/mayo-vprometheus-lawless-decision-wreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/ (criticizing Mayo and Alice).
84 See, e.g., Charles Bieneman et al., How to Practice Patent Law After Alice, HOLZER PATEL
DRENNAN (Feb. 2012), http://hpdlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/How-to-Practice-Patent-LawAfter-Alice.pdf.
85 See, e.g., Lara Cartwright-Smith, Patenting Genes: What Does Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Mean for Genetic Testing and Research?, 129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 289
(2014) (discussing confusion/lack of clarity in health and medicine after Myriad Supreme Court).
86 See,
e.g.,
Decoding
Patent
Eligibility
Post-Alice,
FENWICK
& WEST,
https://www.fenwick.com/pages/post-alice.aspx (last updated Oct. 17, 2019) (displaying graphic showing
comparison of upheld and invalidated cases and bases for each decision, through Oct. 2019); Chart of
Post-Alice Cases, GIBSON DUNN (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Overview-of-Section-101-Patent-Cases-Decided-After-Alice-v-CLS-as-of-0301-19.pdf.
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However, while the Patent and Trademark Office has certainly issued a
number of guidance documents and reports addressing section 101
examination,87 in response to changes in the law and particularly after Alice,88
as a forward-thinking society, we should be encouraged by a dynamic and
responsive patent agency. It certainly makes it more difficult for patent
practitioners to keep up when there are multiple Guidance documents
describing how examiners will assess patent eligibility for processes within
the same calendar year.89 These changes reflect that the Office is selfreflective, evaluating, assessing, and revising its practices as it learns from
its own outcomes. There is no requirement of a set schedule for issuing new
documents as it sees fit and necessary should result in greater certainty that
patents that issue from the office in the wave of new Guidance documents
responsive to Alice are less likely to be threatened or invalidated than if fewer
clarifying memos and documents had been provided.
Some argue that immediately after Alice we saw an immediate drop in
the number of business-method patents being allowed, as demonstrated by a
drastically different rate of Allowance Per Office Action (APOA) as
compared to pre-Alice, and that fact is indicative of it being more difficult to
get a patent through to allowance in the post-Alice world.90 This author
submits that an immediate decline in allowances is exactly what one should
expect when a test is changed, particularly if the applications that had been
pending at that time were filed and being examined using an altogether
different structure. No patent application is filed, examined, and allowed on
the same day. Thus, when both Mayo and Alice were decided, the applications
pending at those times would have been filed with prior tests in mind. Once
charged with applying the new tests and provided Guidance via the agency,
examiners would look at their pending patent applications and ascertain
87 See
Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-andregulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility.
88 Taskalos, supra note 35 ( Since the Alice decision, the USPTO has issued new guidance
regarding how patent examiners are to analyze claims under section 101 at least once a year, with the
exception of 2017. As many practitioners would attest, the application of the guidance can vary between
examiners and art units, resulting in general confusion as to what exactly makes one claim patent eligible
over another. ).
89 For instance, the October 2019 Guidance replaced the January 2019 Guidance.
90 See Mark Nowotarski, Business Method Patents Recover Under USPTO Guidance,
IPWATCHDOG (May 19, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/19/business-method-patentsrecover-uspto-guidance/id=109307/ ( [A]llowances per office action (APOA) dropped from 17% before
the 2014 Alice decision to 4% right after the Alice decision . . . . APOA rose to 17% in 2019 after the new
2019 Guidance came out in January, [which is] . . . its pre-Alice level. ) Allowances per office action
h the applicant responds prior to receiving an
allowance. Therefore, an APOA of 1/5 (~20%) means that an applicant is likely to receive an allowance
after 5 prior office actions. By comparison, APOA of 1/20 (~5%) means that the applicant will likely face
20 office actions (a sum that is impracticable) prior to an allowance, translating into very few allowances.
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which already met the new test thresholds and predictably many would not.
Given that the new test would take some time for practitioners to integrate, it
should not have been a shock when there were many rejections immediately
after Alice.
What is more indicative of the difficulty level of prosecuting a process
or business method patent post-Alice is the current rate of Allowances Per
Office Action (APOA). Sufficient time has elapsed since Alice that patents
more recently allowed were more likely to have been filed with inventors and
practitioners in full knowledge of the Mayo/Alice framework. These
applications certainly would have been examined using that framework and
the various Guidance documents provided to examiners by the PTO. And
thus, the current APOA (2019) which is identical to the pre-Alice APOA is a
better indicator as to whether it is more difficult to prosecute a process or
business method patent in the Office. When viewed through this lens
factoring in time and revision of office practices, this author suggests it is
neither more difficult nor less so to obtain an allowance
D.

What the Future Holds: The Legislative Lion?

It is an understatement to say that the industry was displeased with the
Mayo/Alice test.91 With many patents being invalidated, since as mentioned
above, they would not have been prosecuted with that test in mind, it should
come as surprise to absolutely no one that industry would lobby for anything
that could result in unearthing Mayo/Alice.92 Accordingly, with pressure from
stakeholders,93 Congressional activity through 2019 was plentiful. Of major
significance is that which was largely unseen a draft bill proposing patent
reform, that aimed in part to amend section 101. The formal bill stalled
initially due to disagreements about the proposed amendment to section
112(f) and the interplay between sections 101 and 112,94 and later due to

91

See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
See, e.g., Taskalos, supra note 35 ( The impetus for such reform stems from uncertainties in
recent case law regarding what qualifies as patent-eligible subject matter since the U.S. Supreme Court s
holdings in Mayo Collaborative Services, DBA v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and Alice
Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). ).
93 Eileen McDermott, Draft of Proposed New Section 101 Reflects Patent Owner Input,
IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/22/draft-text-proposed-newsection-101-reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498/ (Range of comments and reactions on the draft bill,
including Hank Johnson: Section 101 of the Patent Act is foundational to the patent system, but recent
court cases have upset what should be solid ground. ).
94 Anthony J. Fuga, Bloomberg Law: There Is a Lack of Consensus Among Stakeholders on Patent
Eligibility Reform, HOLLAND & KNIGHT SECTION 101 BLOG (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.hklaw.com/es/insights/publications/2019/10/bloomberg-law-there-is-a-lack-of-consensusamong-stakeholders.
92
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95

Given the potential for uptake of this
issue in a future Congress, the draft that was released and the discussions in
hearings97 are illuminating as to the ideas floated and discussed between the
Subcommittee and stakeholders.
In the draft bill released in May 2019, section 101 would have included
the following language:
96

The provisions of section 101 shall be construed in favor of
eligibility.
No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject
laws of
patent eligibility under section 101, and all cases
establishing or interpreting those exceptions to eligibility are
hereby abrogated
The eligibility of a claimed invention under section 101 shall
be determined without regard to: the manner in which the
claimed invention was made; whether individual limitations
of a claim are well known, conventional or routine; the state
of the art at the time of the invention; or any other
considerations relating to sections 103, 103, or 112 of this
title. 98
Of critical significance is that the language in this bill would have sought
to explicitly remove the judicial exceptions from the determination of patenteligibility, effectively vaporizing decades of case law and raising questions
95 In early 2020, Senator Thom Tillis, Chair of the Senate s Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property, noted that the Subcommittee is not against patent eligibility reform, but all stakeholders [need]
to work with Senator Coons and [him] to develop a consensus driven approach. Short of this, according
to Tillis, the Subcommittee would not be [able to] complet[e] its work on legislatively addressing patent
eligibility due to the reasonable concerns that have been expressed about the draft as well as the practical
realities of the difficulty of passing legislation . . . in this Congress. Michael Borella, The Zombie
Apocalypse of Patent Eligibility Reform and a Possible Escape Route, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2020/02/the-zombie-apocalypse-of-patent-eligibility-reform-and-a-possibleescape-route.html.
96 Id. (Based on Sen. Tillis statements, it appears that patent eligibility reform is in an undead
state ostensibly alive but not currently breathing. ).
97
April 17, 2019: release of bipartisan bicameral framework for reform of section 101. Press
Release, Thom Tillis, U.S. Senator (April 17, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/4/sens-tillis-andcoons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-section-101-patent-reform-framework. May 22,
2019: Draft bill released; June 2019: Public hearings; Formal Bill was announced as expected in
September or October 2019. However, 2019 ended without introduction of the bill into Congress.
98 This draft bill was provided to many stakeholders and thus is written about and found on a
number of private websites. As a Senate proposed bill, but not yet formally introduced or numbered, the
only government site where it could be reasonably located was the Senate website s file. SENATE.GOV,
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/E8ED2188-DC15-4876-8F51-A03CF4A63E26 (last visited
Jan. 4, 2020).
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as to retroactivity to pending applications and recently allowed patents, or
only prospective filings.99
that which is written either in the Constitution or in statutes created by
and harmony between the different sub-branches, and the foundational
documents. For these systems to work, while there may be times when one
ctify the actions of another, there is also a
level of trust and respect necessary and that all are acting with the best
interests of the nation at hand.
While some have argued in support of proposals that abrogate
Bilski/Mayo/Alice,100 there are other ways to achieve the goal of broadening
the scope of patent eligibility, if that is what Congress so chooses to do,
without discarding a virtual library of precedent and replacing it with a
vacuum.101 In other situations where Congress has sought to respond to
judicial outcomes, it has chosen to pass amendments or new statutory
provisions stating more clearly how it intends for the matter to be resolved.
This approach considers all we know and all we can foresee, not by asking
what should have been done, but by focusing on what the law should be in
light of our present and foreseeable knowledge. However, contrary to this
informed forward-looking perspective, proposals like the draft bill which
support abrogation of Bilski/Mayo/Alice purposefully rest Office Actions of
tomorrow on a foundation from a prior era, based on an implicit assertion that
our patent eligibility jurisprudence permitted broader discoveries when we
knew less. These proposals would have patent prosecution of today
technologies evaluated based on language formulated at a time when
humankind knew a microscopic fraction about innovation of what we now
know. When prosecuted through that framework, almost everything would
be patent eligible102 which may in fact have the opposite effect than that
the volume of patented processes increases, and companies have increased
(though potentially patent invalid) options for development. This shifts the
99 It should be noted that as per Article I, Section 9 and Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution,
Congress and the states are prohibited from passing ex post facto laws. If this bill were to become law,
some would argue that it could only apply prospectively and could not operate to revalidate/reopen already
invalidated patents.
100 See, e.g., Borella, supra note 95 (proposing that we should (i) let § 101 reform happen,
abrogating Alice, Mayo, and essentially all § 101 jurisprudence since the 1952 Patent Act, so that there
are no more ill-defined judicial exceptions, and (ii) allow rapid, limited-scope, pre-discovery motions for
claim invalidity in district courts. ).
101 Greenspoon, supra note 33 ( Alice was an interpretation of Mayo, which was an interpretation
of Flook, which was an interpretation of Benson, which was supposed to be an interpretation of what
Congress meant by the short and crisp statement of Section 101 of the Patent Act. But just as a photocopy
of a photocopy of a photocopy gets more distorted with each generation, so did Supreme Court rulings. ).
102 Id.
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burden of examination from a corps of science, technology, and engineering
examiners in the Patent Office to a wide array of district court judges from
different backgrounds with varying levels of experience and exposure to the
complex underpinnings of patent law. Moreover, it leaves the judiciary to
sort the wheat from the chaff by addressing patent eligibility solely in
motions, greatly increases the stakes in pre-trial motion practice, rests undue
and possible excessive weight on expert testimony, and risks overwhelming
the district courts with unnecessary litigation. Moving one complication into
another branch defers the analysis; it does little to resolve the issue at the
core what should be eligible for patent?
If Congress seeks to amend the Patent Act, and in particular address
that mission, and it should not dial back from that responsibility by offloading
it elsewhere in the pipeline. At present, one criticism of the Mayo/Alice test
is that it is so vague that it makes potentially everything and nothing patent
eligible, which is actually as broad and flexible as the Court intended for it
to be. Should Congress eventually pass legislation that removes all
guideposts from patent eligibility, the threshold for patent eligibility of
innovations would also be so broad as to render everything and nothing patent
eligible. As such, the patent community stands to be in no better a situation
than the current one by removing these goalposts, as bitter as they taste,
heads in the dark against every Tom, Dick, and Harry with a patent, relying
entirely on firm and consistent application of the other sections of the Patent
Act and uniform and consistent testimony and judicial decision on motions
across 94 districts to invalidate or block the true overbroad applications and
patents.103 The power to correct the ambiguity by revising the language in
expected of it by the Constitution. It is imperative that Congress itself come
together, engage with stakeholders, and make the difficult decisions in
recognition that it is impracticable to expect an outcome on reform that
satisfies all the desires of all parties, but it is not impossible to create a
solution that provides a clearer path.
VI. SO, WHAT NOW?
Society and the patent community need to continue to take active roles
in determining what they want the process patent landscape to look like. At
all levels, it is important to recognize that as technology advances the
determination of what is foundational is going to become a more complex,
103
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higher baseline e.g., when we knew little, then much more simple
technology was the foundation, but the more we know, the thicker and more
advanced the foundation for it is. It logically follows that we would not want
to limit access to the foundation, since doing so threatens to impede the
wheels of progress. One problematic aspect of deferring too much to the
judiciary to interpret technology-based aspects of law is that the continual
change of tests for patent eligibility continues to result in the invalidation of
a patent to an innovation that was fairly allowed and novel under the test of
its time but fails under a test of the future. This retroactive effect in patent
invalidity proceedings exists even though applying legislative provisions
retroactively is disfavored when doing so would impair a substantive right.104
One plausible means of addressing process patent invalidity solely
based on retroactive application of a judicial interpretation or test would be
to implement a graduated invalidity scheme. For those patented innovations
th
be provided with a notice period, followed by a step-down approach to the
rights afforded from the patent grant. This would have less harsh results than
immediate invalidation. In one iteration of this model, particular claims in a
patent that were validly allowed at the time issued, but fail to pass a future
test for patent eligibility could carry a one-year notice period, during which
the innovation is compulsory licensed or otherwise contractually shared with
public research institutions and entities, and after the notice period being
freely available to all.
It is difficult to predict how a future Court will interpret section 101 and
the existing tests, and this temperamental unpredictability complicates patent
prosecution and for companies can make it difficult to recoup Research &
Development costs without scattershot patent filings in the hope something
sticks longer term. If this retroactive and thereby by definition unpredictable
variation in patent validity on section 101 is unpleasant to Congress and
various stakeholders, then Congress needs to uphold its duty and continue to
work to devise a statutory structure that
better encapsulates what threshold process patents must pass in the world of
2020 and beyond.
The outcomes discussed herein are not to say that companies cannot use
economic principles, data and statistics, or medical diagnostic processes to
further their businesses and gain success over competitors, nor that
companies have no means to keep competitors from using the same models
104 See e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324-25 (2016) (discussing Constitutional
restrictions on retroactive legislation); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)
( [R]etroactivity is not favored in the law, and its interpretive corollary that congressional enactments
and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result. ). See also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 610-12 (2003) (discussing Ex Post Facto laws).
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and methods, or to protect their R&D. It may be that for some types of
medical processes and business methods, the particular type of bargain
achieved by patent a monopoly for a term of years in exchange for open
and public disclosure may not in fact be the best vehicle for protecting the
intellectual property. In some circumstances, it may be that the process or
method should not be restricted in any way from the public. For example,
when it comes to protecting mass public health, morality and public welfare
claims satisfied this or that test. Here, there is a defensible argument that
based on best interests for society, the immediate invalidation of any patent
that no longer meets the test of the time is necessary.
In other situations, inventors and researchers may opt to engage in
explicit contractual relationships or collaborations for sharing of methods for
periods of time, thus working towards a common goal using resources and
technology beneficial to both. Further, it is conceivable that trade secrets may
be of use in protecting some types of business method innovations and that
for others, securing a copyright may be a more lucrative option. However, in
the realm of patents, for the immediate future subject to bills to come, the
Mayo/Alice test is bread and butter.
While the patent community may be understandably frustrated with
cycles of Court interventions and transient tests, the solution is not to abolish
four decades of carefully laid precedent. We would be no better off with a
stagnant and uninvolved Supreme Cour
not
while the pace of innovation already outpaces our active federal judiciary
just as we are not better off with a Congressional body which abandons the
task because it is too difficult. Quite to the contrary, the patent laws will be
more meaningful with both the judiciary and the legislature taking active
roles in ensuring that the rules and tests reflect the general intention of the
era and the parties involved in process patent eligibility discussions will need
to compromise for there to be meaningful patent reform.105 Any reform to the
standards for evaluating process patents for section 101 eligibility must yield
an analytical framework that is both temperamental and transient, so that it is
responsive to growing technology and not perceived by inventors or
practitioners as a fixed, rigid structure. In the meantime, as long as it is the
concomitant variability in the Mayo/Alice test will require more careful,
deliberate, and thoughtful process patent claim drafting and prosecution in
contemplation of potential alternate tests, and an eye to the future for agency
Guidance documents and possible legislative action in an upcoming term.

105

See Borella, supra note 95.

